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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- CaseNo.10031. 
LEi\ 0 ~ 1:\R TINEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Leno Martinez, was convicted upon jury 
trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, 
State of Utah, of the crime of burglary. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
An information charging the appellant with the crime 
of burglary in the second degree was filed December 17, 
1962. On the 27th day of December, 1962, the appellant, 
through his counsel, Norman B. Hendricks, filed a motion 
for a continuance for time to enter a plea. The continuance 
was granted. On January 8, 1963, the defendant, in the 
presence of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. There-
after, various preliminary steps were taken. On March 12, 
1963, notice of a trial setting in the case for April16, 1963, 
was sent to counsel for the defendant. An amended notice 
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of trial setting on March 19th was sent to counsel, setting 
trial for March 27th. At the time set for trial the defendant 
was tried by jury and convicted. He was represented by 
counsel other than the counsel who had first represented 
him. A motion for new trial was filed on April1, 1963, and 
on May 28, 1963, the motion for new trial was denied and 
the defendant committed to the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the decision of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts 
in addition to those stated in the brief of the appellant, but 
concedes the accuracy of the facts stated in the appellant's 
brief only to the extent they appear in the record on appeal. 
On the 13th day of December, 1962, a complaint was 
issued in the City Court of Ogden City, charging the de-
fendant with the crime of burglary in the second degree. 
Preliminary hearing was waived on December 14, 1962 by 
the defendant and he was admitted to bail. On December 
17th, an information was filed by the District Attorney 
charging the defendant with second degree burglary, and 
the court appointed Ralph Raat, Esq., to represent the de-
fendant (R. 2, 3). On December 24, 1962, the appellant 
was brought before the court for arraignment ( R. 6). Mr. 
Raat had withdrawn and the appellant was represented by 
Norman B. Hendricks, Esq. The case was continued pur-
suant to defense motion to allow the defendant to enter a 
plea. On January 8, 1963, the appellant entered a plea of 
not guilty and the matter was set down for trial (R. 8). On 
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the same day a drmand for a bill of particulars was filed 
and a motion to suppress evidence (R. 9, 10). Notice of 
trial setting was mailed to Mr. Norman Hendricks, the ap-
pellant's counsel, on the 11th and 19th day of March ( R. 
14, 15). On the 27th day of March, the date set for trial, 
the defendant appeared in court represented by Gordon 
Hoxsie. Mr. Hoxsie indicated that Mr. Hendricks had 
withdrawn and moved the court for additional relief (R. 
17). 
The appellant moved the court for permission to change 
his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity, which the court 
denied (R. 17-A). The court indicated that the defendant 
could bring out on direct examination of his client any issue 
of sanity and present the matter to the jury (R. 17-A). 
Thereafter trial was held and the appellant was found 
guilty ( R. 20) . 
On Aprill, 1963, a motion for new trial was filed by the 
appellant on the grounds that the trial court erred in not 
allowing a change of plea to not guilty by reason of insanity 
and newly discovered evidence (R. 22). On May 28, 1963, 
the court heard the motion for a new trial. In support of 
the motion for new trial, two letters were considered by the 
court (R. 30, 38). The first was a letter from Ernest G. 
Beier, a psychologist, as to the results of psychological tests 
given to the appellant. The second was a letter from Dr. 
Charles E. Parmalee as to an examination performed on the 
appellant. In the letter of Dr. Parmalee, he indicates that 
he first saw the appellant when requested to do so by Nor-
man Hendricks, appellant's previous attorney, on Decem-
ber 26, 1962. In neither of the letters does either person con-
clude that the appellant did not understand the nature of 
the act he did, or not know that the act was wrong, or that 
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he was in anyway prohibited from adhering to the right 
( R. 30, 38) . Neither of the letters presented were in affi-
davit form. The trial court overruled the appellant's mo-
tion for new trial. 
In the appellant's brief, page 7, there is a letter dated 
December 18, 1963, from Dr. Parmalee to Judge Foley of 
the Federal District Court of Nevada, referring to a federal 
criminal charge against the appellant. This letter was not 
received or considered by the trial court on the motion for 
new trial, nor does it appear to have been offered. In that 
letter, however, the Doctor notes that he had first examined 
the appellant on December 26, 1962, at the request of Nor-
man Hendricks, appellant's counsel. A comparison of the 
letter of Dr. Parmalee, dated December 18, 1963, to Judge 
Foley, and the letter presented to Judge Jones at the time of 
the motion for new trial, indicates that the diagnosis was 
generally the same. Again, the letter to Judge Foley does 
not indicate whether or not the Doctor is of the opinion the 
appellant was legally insane. 
No notice pursuant to 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953, was filed 
by the appellant indicating that he intended to raise a de-
fense of insanity. Additionally, it should be noted that the 
record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the pro-
ceedings before the trial court, but merely contains the par-
ticular pleadings filed and minute entries of what occurred. 
The nature of the evidence, the arguments made and the 
reasons for the rulings do not appear from the record. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
DENYIN(; THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALLOW A 
CHAN<;E OF PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO ONE OF NOT 
GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY, SINCE A PLEA OF 
NOT GUlL TY BY REASON OF INSANITY IS UNKNOWN 
TO UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOR DID THE TRIAL 
COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR A CONTINUANCE. 
In Point I of the appellant's brief he contends that the 
trial court erred in not allowing a change of plea from not 
guilty to not guilty by reason of insanity. It is submitted that 
the trial court committed no error in this regard since there 
is no provision in Utah law for a plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity. 77-24-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"There are four kinds of pleas to an indictment or information: 
(1) Guilty. 
(2) Not guilty. 
(3) A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the of-
fense charged. 
( 4) Once in jeopardy. 
A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of 
the other pleas." 
The only provisions in the Utah Code providing for a 
restriction upon the defense of insanity are those which re-
quire that notice of a proposed defense of insanity be given 
prior to the time of trial. Thus, 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953, 
provides: 
"Whenever a defendant shall propose to offer in his defense evi-
dence that he is not guilty by reason of insanity, such defendant 
shall at the time of the arraignment, or within ten days thereafter 
but not less than four d~ys before the trial of such cause, file and 
~rve upon the prosecuting attorney in such cause, notice in writ-
mg of his intention to claim such defense. If the defendant fails 
to file such notice, he shall not be entitled to introduce evidence 
tending to establish such defense. The court may, however, per-
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mit such evidence to be introduced where good cause for the fail-
ure to file notice has been made to appear." 
In the instant case the record does not reflect that the 
appellant filed any notice of an intention to raise the defense 
of insanity within the time required by statute. The court's 
duty to appoint alienists to examine the defendant is based 
upon prior notice of the defense of insanity being given to 
the court. 77-24-17, U.C.A. 1953. The trial court, there-
fore, acted correctly in not accepting any change of plea 
since a plea of not guilty could raise the defense of insanity 
were notice of insanity timely filed. Further, it is well settled 
that the failure to file timely notice will, in the discretion of 
the trial court, preclude the receipt of evidence based upon 
the defense of insanity. 
In 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 449, p. 1264, it is stated 
with reference to statutes requiring that notice be given of 
the defense of insanity: 
"Where an accused fails to give notice at the time required, he has 
no absolute right to avail himself of the insanity defense, although 
the court may, in its discretion for just cause shown, permit him to 
do so." 
In State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P.2d 222 (1942), 
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a similar provision of 
Oregon law, ruling that it was a legitimate exercise of pro-
cedural power. The court stated: 
"The foregoing authorities establish that the Oregon statute, insofar 
as it requires notice of purpose to present the insanity defense, is 
valid. Counsel for the defendant recognized and the authorities 
also demonstrate that the statute was applicable to the case at bar 
and that the only question is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. No such abuse appears from the record. No question 
was ever asked concerning the defendant's ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong or concerning his previous or subsequent 
mental condition.***" 
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See also People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 880; 
Pt~ople v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767; People v. 
LfoTZg Fook, ~06 Cal. 64, 273 Pac. 779. 
:\ similar result was reached by the Arizona court in 
State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 348 P.2d 731 ( 1960), where the 
court ruled that the failure to give timely notice of the de-
fense of insanity precluded the defendant from claiming 
that it was error for the trial court not to allow the presenta-
tion of evidence on the issue. 
In People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 880, 
the California court was faced with a situation almost iden-
tical to that in the instant case and the court ruled that there 
was no basis for a claim of error. In doing so the court noted 
that the case had been pending for some months before trial 
and had been delayed in one instance at the request of the 
appellant. 
Even so, however, in the instant case Judge Jones indi-
cated that the defendant could present any evidence on the 
insanity issue he desired ( R. 17). Further, the record clearly 
demonstrates that counsel for the appellant had ample time 
within which to file a notice of a plea of insanity. 
In December, 1962, appellant's counsel, Norman Hen-
dricks, had had the appellant examined by a psychiatrist. 
Consequendy, in 1963, at the time he assumed the defense 
in the instant case, he was well aware of any claims to the 
appellant's mental condition. Being so advised, counsel, 
had he felt it worthwhile, could well have filed timely notice 
of the defense of insanity. Since the plea which the appel-
lant sought to impose is improper, he can claim no error on 
that basis, nor can the appellant claim error in denying him 
a continuance since, as noted above, a continuance for the 
purposes of raising the defense of insanity was a matter 
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within the sound discretion of the court since no timely 
notice four days prior to the time when trial was set was 
filed, even though counsel then representing the appellant 
had timely notice of the date of the trial and had notice of 
the mental condition of the appellant. 
Finally, there would be no error in the court refusing 
to grant the appellant a continuance. The case had been 
pending for some time. The record is completely silent as to 
the basis upon which the appellant sought to justify his con-
tinuance, the reasons for withdrawal of prior counsel and 
the extent of preparation that counsel who handled the case 
at trial had made, and whether there had been any con-
sultation with the previous counsel. 
In State v. Mathis, 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957), 
this court noted : 
"The request for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be 
disturbed. * * *" 
This court has repeatedly followed the rule that the trial 
judge will only be held to have erred if in exercising his 
discretion he went beyond the bounds of reason and thus 
denied the accused an opportunity for a fair trial. State v. 
Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P.2d 692 ( 1935); State v. 
Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 ( 1936); State v. Hart-
man, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 ( 1941); State v. Wil-
liams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 ( 1917); State v. Cano, 
64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 ( 1924); State v. Anselmo, 46 
Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071 ( 1915). This is the rule of gen-
eral application in this country, and the courts have ruled 
that this is true even where the claim of insufficient time 
for preparation is made. Prescott v. State, 56 Okl. Cr. 259, 
37 P.2d 830 ( 1934); State v. Badgley, 140 Kan. 349, 37 
P.2d 16 ( 1934). 
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In Statr u. McQueen, 14 U.2d 311, 383 P.2d 921 
( 1963), a continuance was requested where counsel had 
lwt~n appointed to represent the defendant only one and 
one-half days prior to trial. However, it appeared that pre-
\'ious counsel had been retained some months before and 
had consulted with counsel at the time of trial. The court 
noted that the question of continuance was within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and ruled that there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
Finally, it should be observed that since the appellant 
has not brought before the court a complete record of what 
transpired at the time the motion for continuance was 
made, it must be presumed that the trial court had sufficient 
basis to support its judgment. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 U.2d 
406, 385 P.2d 154 ( 1963) ; Baine v. Beckstead, 10 U.2d 4, 
347 P.2d 554 (1959); johnson v. People's Finance and 
Thrift Company, 2 U.2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 ( 1952). 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DENY-
I~G THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
The appellant assigns as error the failure of the trial 
court to grant a new trial. Once again the record does not 
disclose in specific detail the arguments of the parties or the 
basis upon which the court acted in denying a new trial. 
The appellant apparently takes the position that the court 
should have granted a new trial based upon newly discov-
ered evidence. 77-38-3 (7), U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"When new evidence has been discovered, material to the defend-
ant and which he could not with reasonable diligence have dis-
covered and produced at the trial." 
In addition, the before referenced section also provides: 
.. ,~·hen a motion for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly 
dtscovered evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing in 
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support thereof the affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evi-
dence is expected to be given, and if time is required by the defend-
ant to procure such affidavits, the court may postpone the hearing 
of the motion for such length of time as under all the circum-
stances of the case may seem reasonable." 
As can be seen from the statutory requirements, in order to 
allow a motion for newly discovered evidence, it must ap-
pear that the evidence was material and could not have 
been obtained with reasonable diligence at the time of trial. 
Further, the statute specifically requires that any claim of 
newly discovered evidence be set down in affidavit form. 
In the insant case the appellant offered two letters, one 
from a psychologist, and one from a medical doctor. Neither 
of these letters are in affidavit form. This, in and of itself, 
would have been sufficient grounds to warrant the denial of 
the motion for new trial. In addition, it is submitted that 
there are numerous other reasons upon which the court 
could properly have based its decision in denying the ap-
pellant's motion. 
InStatev. Weaver, 78Utah555,6P.2d 167 (1931),this 
court noted : 
"Newly discovered evidence, to be ground for a new trial, must 
satisfy several elementary requirements. The courts are not in 
accord respecting all these requirements, but fairly agree that the 
newly discovered evidence be such as could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial, that it 
be not merely cumulative, and that it be such as to render a dif-
ferent result probable on the retrial of the case." 
In State v. Moore, 41 Utah 247 (1912), this court 
denied an appellant's claim that a new trial should have 
been granted based upon newly discovered evidence where 
it was clear that with reasonable diligence the evidence 
could have been ascertained at the time of trial. 
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In State l'. At ontgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 Pac. 815 
( 191 0) , this court noted : 
"* * * It is elementary that, in granting or refusing motions for 
new trials, a certain amount of discretion is vested in the trial 
courts which they alone can exercise.***" 
In addition, the court stated that in order for newly dis-
covered evidence to justify a new trial, it must appear that 
the evidence was so strong as to have affected the result. 
Thus, the court stated: 
"* * * In no event, therefore, is this so-called newly discovered evi-
dence 'so conclusive in its character as to raise a reasonable pre-
sumption that the result of a second trial would be different from 
the first,' which would have to be the case in order to authorize us 
to grant a new trial. * * *" 
Applying these rules to the facts of the instant case, it is 
clear, first of all, that the appellant did not use due diligence 
and, in fact, that the evidence is not newly discovered. The 
letter offered to the court dated May 20, 1963, from Dr. 
Parmalee, expressly notes that the original examination of 
the appellant was made on December 26, 1962 at the re-
quest of the appellant's attorney who represented the ap-
pellant in the instant case up until a few days before trial. 
Consequently, the evidence was well known to counsel rep-
resenting the appellant long before trial. The letter to 
Judge Foley from Dr. Parmalee, although not a matter of 
record, also notes that the appellant's counsel knew of the 
psychiatric situation of the appellant. It is obvious that this 
is evidence which clearly was known to the appellant, which 
one of appellant's counsel was fully aware of, and which 
could have been presented at the trial had due diligence 
been exercised. 
Secondlv, it should be noted that in none of the letters 
and materials from the psychiatrist is there any indication 
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that the defendant was legally insane within the rules laid 
down by this court in State v. Kirkham, 7 U.2d 108, 319 
P.2d 859 ( 1957), and State v. Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381 
P.2d 93 ( 1963). Consequently, it cannot be said that the 
evidence offered in support of the motion for new trial was 
of such a conclusive nature that the result would have been 
different. Indeed, the letters make little reference to the 
crime in question and generally are not directed to the ques-
tion of whether or not the defendant was legally sane or in-
sane at the time of the commission of the offense. 
Finally, it should be noted that since the appellant filed 
no notice of an intention to raise the defense of insanity, and 
apparently did so fully realizing his previous psychiatric his-
tory, as did counsel who then represented the appellant, 
there would be no basis to warrant a new trial since the 
appellant, having notice of the possible defense, waived it. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by the appellant in support of relief 
from this court clearly show that he is both procedurally 
and substantively without remedy. As a consequence, this 
court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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